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Forthcoming in Inquiry
Abstract
This paper excavates a debate concerning the claims of ordinary language philoso-
phers that took place during the middle of the last century. The debate centers on the
status of statements about “what we say”. On one side of the debate, critics of ordinary
language philosophy argued that statements about “what we say” should be evaluated
as empirical observations about how people do in fact speak, on a par with claims made
in the language sciences. By that standard, ordinary language philosophers were not
entitled to the claims that they made about what we would say about various topics. On
the other side of the debate, defenders of the methods of ordinary language philosophy
sought to explain how philosophers can be entitled to statements about what we would
say without engaging in extensive observations of how people do in fact use language.
In this paper I defend the idea that entitlement to claims about what we say can be had
in a way that doesn’t require empirical observation, and I argue that ordinary language
philosophers are (at least sometimes) engaged in a different project than linguists or
empirically minded philosophers of language, which is subject to different conditions
of success.
1 The historical scene of the debate
In 1957, there was an official confrontation between philosophers with radically opposed
estimations of the significance of ordinary language philosophy. On one side was Stanley
Cavell, then still working on his Harvard dissertation but already teaching at UC Berkeley.
Cavell had been deeply impressed by Austin’s practice of ordinary language philosophy
while attending his 1955 classes at Harvard (Cavell 2010, pp. 322–326), and he lectured
on Austin in the spring term of 1957 at Berkeley (pp. 334–335).1 On the other side of the
∗This project is supported by an External Faculty Fellowship at Stanford’s Humanities Center and a Lever-
hulme Research Project Grant, RPG-2016-193. Thanks to Eliot Michaelson, Chauncey Maher, Dan Lassiter,
Jay Elliott, Bruno Ambroise, Zed Adams, participants in the Cavell seminar at the New School for Social
Research and the fellows’ workshop at Stanford University’s Humanities Center for very helpful comments.
1Austin himself was at Berkeley in 1958–1959, giving the series of lectures that would become Sense and
Sensibilia—see Cavell (1976b, p. 97 n. 3).
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confrontation was his colleague Benson Mates, a logician and historian of ancient philos-
ophy. Cavell says, “My insistence on the treasures I was finding Austin to have brought
to philosophy was getting on the nerves of some accomplished teachers in and around my
senior colleagues in the Berkeley department”, and he was invited (or “ordered” (p. 360))
to defend the methods of ordinary language philosophy at the 1957 Christmas Pacific APA
at Stanford. His opponent was Mates, who himself taught a seminar on Austin’s “A Plea
for Excuses” in 1957. Mates’s seminar was attended by several visiting advocates of “em-
pirical semantics”, a midcentury version of experimental philosophy that originated in Nor-
way. The empirical semanticists rejected “anti-empirically oriented armchair [philosophy]”
(Naess 1938, p. viii; quoted in Murphy 2015, p. 325) and conducted surveys of how philo-
sophically significant expressions were used by non-philosophers. Mates and the empirical
semanticists in his seminar were skeptical about Austin’s informal methods of investigating
ordinary language, and Mates’s contribution to the APA symposium grew out of notes from
his seminar (Murphy, 2015, p. 350–352).
Cavell reports that his response to Mates at the APA was “well enough received”, mean-
ing “that those who were pulling for me thought I had answered Mates’s objections, and
those who were not pulling for me thought I had lived to fight another day” (Cavell, 2010,
p. 361). Mates and Cavell published their contributions to the symposium in the first vol-
ume of the new Norwegian journal Inquiry, founded by Arne Naess, which also went on to
publish experimental work by the empirical semanticists (see Chapman 2011).
Cavell’s defense of the methods of ordinary language philosophy against Mates’s criti-
cisms, “Must We Mean What We Say?”, was, Cavell says, “the first text I published that I
still care about” (Cavell 2010, p. 361), and Mulhall (1999, p. 1) says that “Cavell’s response
to Mates underpins everything else [Cavell] has written”. Cavell also reports that, accord-
ing to Bernard Williams, Austin had “pushed to have graduate students and younger dons
at Oxford” read it (Cavell 2010, p. 149). But it also attracted intense criticism from ad-
vocates of the new, scientifically-minded philosophy of language being developed at MIT
(Fodor and Katz, 1963). Cavell, recalling the message of Fodor and Katz (1963), says they
asserted
. . . (I believe I can recall the exact words) that the articles [“Must We Mean
What We Say” and “The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy”]
were ‘deleterious to the future of philosophy’ (p. 442).
Cavell is slightly misremembering here. What Fodor and Katz actually say is:
The position Cavell advocates in [the two articles] seems to us, however, to
be mistaken in every significant respect and to be pernicious both for an ad-
equate understanding of ordinary language philosophy and for an adequate
understanding of ordinary language (Fodor and Katz, 1963, p. 57).
There were later defenses of Cavell (Henson, 1965; Bates and Cohen, 1972), and at-
tempts to defend the methods of ordinary language philosophy against Mates and Fodor and
Katz, whether or not such defenses would be endorsed by Cavell (Searle, 1969; Vendler,
1967). And the Mates-Cavell debate was reprinted in two volumes focusing on the methods
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of ordinary language philosophy (Chappell, 1964; Lyas, 1971). But the debate eventually
fizzled out for whatever reasons philosophical debates end even when the philosophical
problems motivating the debate haven’t been resolved (lack of interest, change of fashion).
Recently, however, questions about the proper methodology of philosophy of language and
the relevance of formal experiments to the investigation of meaning have been posed again
by 21st century advocates of experimental philosophy and their critics, and by new advo-
cates of ordinary language philosophy.2 Reexamining the 1957 debate permits an assess-
ment of the success or failure of the original arguments for and against ordinary language
philosophy from a sufficiently long historical distance to provide a new angle on the old
debate.
2 Mates’s challenge
Mates wonders “how one would go about verifying” the statements made about language
by “the so-called ordinary language philosophers” (Mates, 1958, p. 161). He takes as his
target Ryle’s remarks on “the ordinary sense of ‘voluntary’, [and] ‘involuntary’” (Ryle,
1949, p. 59).
Ryle’s discussion takes place in the context of his attack on “The Will” and the idea
of “volitions” understood as “special acts, or operations ‘in the mind’. . . which somehow
puts my muscles into action”, which are part of the “myth of the ghost in the machine”
(p. 50). Ryle objects to the idea that intentional action involves a mental “volition” partly
on the grounds that “no one, save to endorse the theory, ever describes his own conduct,
or that of his acquaintances, in the recommended idioms” (p. 51). He goes on to describe
the way that “ordinary folk” apply the words “voluntary” and “involuntary”, in contrast to
the “stretched” sense that philosophers who propose a theory of volitions do, in which an
action is voluntary just in case it is caused by a volition, and involuntary just in case it is
not. Here is how Ryle characterizes the ordinary use of “voluntary” and “involuntary”:
In their most ordinary employment ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ are used,
with a few minor elasticities, as adjectives applying to actions which ought not
to be done. We discuss whether someone’s action was voluntary or not only
when the action seems to have been his fault. . .
In this ordinary use, then, it is absurd to discuss whether satisfactory, cor-
rect or admirable performances are voluntary or involuntary (p. 56).
Philosophers “stretch” the ordinary sense of “voluntary” and “involuntary” when they
maintain that those expressions are jointly exhaustive descriptions of human action, which
leads to a “tangle of largely spurious problems, known as the problem of the Freedom of
the Will” (p. 57). In order to avoid that problem, according to Ryle, we need to remind
2For examples of neo-ordinary language philosophy see Baz (2012), DeRose (2005) Fischer (2014), and
Laugier (2013). Hansen (2014) surveys varieties of contemporary ordinary language philosophy. For com-
parisons of the methods of experimental philosophy and ordinary language philosophy, see Sandis (2010)
and Hansen and Chemla (2015). For historical context with a focus on “empirical semantics”, see Murphy
(2015).
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ourselves of the ordinary uses of “voluntary”, “involuntary” and related expressions, and
see how they do not require positing any unverifiable inner acts of will.3
How, Mates wonders, would we go about verifying whether Ryle is right about the way
“voluntary” and “involuntary” are ordinarily used? The most obvious approach would be
to look at how those expressions are in fact used. Mates is doubtful that the “ordinary man”
only applies “voluntary” and “involuntary” to actions that ought not to be done, but he
doesn’t undertake such a study (Mates, 1958, p. 163). He points out that even if it were the
case that the expressions are only applied to actions that ought not to be done, that wouldn’t
establish that doing so was an essential part of the meaning of those expressions—it might
be the case, for example, that “some other factor, such as perhaps a disposition on the part
of the ordinary man to talk more about things of which he disapproves than about things
of which he approves”, could account for the fact (if it were a fact) that “voluntary” and
“involuntary” are ordinarily used as Ryle describes.4
But Ryle thinks that the obvious approach to verifying statements about ordinary use is
“philosophically pointless”. He distinguishes what he calls the “use” of an expression and
the “usage” of that expression:
Usage. . . can be local or widespread, obsolete or current, rural or urban, vulgar
or academic. There cannot be a misusage any more than there can be a mis-
custom or a misvogue. The methods of discovering usages are the methods of
philologists (Ryle, 1953, p. 174–175).
(. . . philologists, that is, and not philosophers.)
“Use”, in contrast, is a “way of operating with. . . a word”, a “technique, knack, or
method”. It is possible to misuse an expression, indeed, it might be the case that popular
usage of an expression substantially diverges from the use of that expression. The “appeal
to prevalence [of usage] is philosophically pointless, besides being philosophically risky”
(Ryle 1953, p. 177). Ryle therefore says he is interested in use, not usage.5 Mates glosses
Ryle’s methodology of “use” over “usage” as indicating that there is something “norma-
tive” about ordinary use, where he understands “normative” to mean that a recommendation
is being made, or that a “use is sanctioned by authority” (p. 165):
[Ryle’s discussion] appears to indicate that for him there is some sort of norma-
tive element in assertions about ordinary use. If the opposite of use is misuse,
then use must be somehow right, proper, or correct (Mates, 1958, p. 164).
3Austin (1962) argues in a similar way that philosophers have “stretched” the meaning of “directly” in the
phrase “directly perceive” to the point of making the expression meaningless.
4This worry is an early example of what has become a standard response to the arguments of the ordinary
language philosophers—offering a pragmatic explanation of a purportedly semantic phenomenon. See Grice
(1961) for another early example of this type of response.
5Contrast Ryle’s view with Horace’s in Ars Poetica: “Many words will be born again that have now sunk
into oblivion, and many will die that are now held in respect, if that’s what usage chooses—usage, which has
the power over the judgment, the law, and the rule of speech” (translation from Lynch 2009, p. 34).
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But Mates dismisses the idea that there is a normative element in assertions about ordi-
nary use for ordinary language philosophers, even though Ryle says that there is: “Despite
Ryle’s own explanations, I am reluctant to believe that the expression ‘ordinary use’ is re-
ally a normative term for the ordinary-language philosophers”. Instead, Mates proposes
that “ordinary use” is a “rough descriptive term” (Mates, 1958, p. 164) where the standards
for evaluating statements about ordinary use are those appropriate for evaluating any other
descriptive statement, including statements about, e.g., whether some particular usage (in
Ryle’s terms) of an expression occurs more frequently than some other usage. And Mates
argues that the “armchair” methods of the ordinary language philosophers do not entitle
them to claim that language is ordinarily used in the way they claim it is ordinarily used, on
the grounds that “even relatively careful authors are often not reliable reporters of their own
linguistic behavior, let alone that of others” and “the intuitive findings of different people,
even of different experts, are often inconsistent” (Mates, 1958, p. 165).
As an example of expert disagreement about ordinary language, Mates cites Austin
discussing the expressions “involuntary/involuntarily” in a way that seems to contradict
Ryle’s observations about the ordinary use of “voluntary” and “involuntary”, as applying
only to actions which ought not to be done:
. . . for example, take ‘voluntarily’ and ‘involuntarily’: we may join the army
or make a gift voluntarily, we may hiccough or make a small gesture involun-
tarily. . . (Austin, 1957, p. 17).
So there is an apparent disagreement between Ryle and Austin, and, as Mates puts it, “If
agreement about usage cannot be reached within so restricted a sample as the class of
Oxford Professors of Philosophy, what are the prospects when the sample is enlarged?”
(Mates, 1958, p. 165).6
Mates also makes a positive proposal for how one should go about verifying statements
about the ordinary use of expressions. He discusses two complementary approaches to
verifying descriptive statements about how words are used: the “extensional” approach,
and the “intensional” approach.
In the extensional approach one observes a reasonably large class of cases in
which the subject applies the word, and then one “sees” or “elicits” the mean-
ing by finding what is common to these cases . . . In the [intensional approach],
one asks the subject what he means by the given word or how he uses it; then
one proceeds in Socratic fashion to test this first answer by confronting the
subject with counterexamples and borderline cases, and so on until the subject
settles down more or less permanently upon a definition or account (Mates,
1958, p. 165–166).
6Note, however, that Ryle and Austin are not, strictly speaking, disagreeing in the passages Mates cites
because Ryle and Austin are discussing different words: the adjectives “voluntary” and “involuntary” in
Ryle’s case, and the adverbs “voluntarily” and “involuntarily” in Austin’s case.
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According to Mates, both the extensional and intensional approaches are equally relevant
to verifying whether someone uses a word in a given way or with a given sense, and there
is no guarantee that the two approaches yield the same results.7 It is possible, for example,
to observe a speaker using a word in a way that she says she would never use it.8
Mates says that ordinary language philosophers “tend toward an armchair version of
the extensional method” of verifying statements about language, and suggests that they ne-
glect the intensional method. Even if philosophers apply “voluntary” and “involuntary” in
different ways than ordinary folk, the two groups may give the same “intensional” account
of the word’s meaning. So there may be evidence that pulls in the direction of thinking that
philosophers use “voluntary” and “involuntary” differently than ordinary folk, and there
may be equally significant evidence that pulls in the opposite direction:
Thus, even if Professor Ryle had determined that ordinary folk in fact apply the
word ‘voluntary’ only to actions which ought not to be done, while philoso-
phers apply it to meritorious actions as well, he would be far from establish-
ing that philosophers and ordinary folk apply the word ‘voluntary’ in different
ways, i.e., attach different senses to it (Mates, 1958, p. 166).
Mates’s challenge to ordinary language philosophy can be summarized as follows:
1. Statements about language made by ordinary language philosophers are descriptive
(evaluable as true or false), not normative (i.e., not advice on how to use language).
2. Skepticism about the ordinary language philosophers’ descriptive claims about lan-
guage is warranted by the fact that (i) speakers are often not reliable reporters of their
own linguistic behavior, and (ii) there is disagreement even among practitioners of
ordinary language philosophy (Ryle and Austin, for example) about how expressions
are used.
7See Hampton and Passanisi (2016) for a defense of the divergence of intensions and extensions in a
contemporary theory of concepts.
8See Labov (1975) and Labov (2006) for examples of mismatches between speakers’ judgments about
how they speak and how they do in fact speak. For example, Labov discusses Philadelphia speakers who say
they never use “anymore” in positive sentences, to mean roughly “nowadays”, who then go on to use it that
way (e.g., “Do you know what’s a lousy show anymore? Johnny Carson”) (Labov 1975, p. 107). And New
Yorkers who were asked whether they pronounced “cards” with [r] or without [r] (cahds) overestimated how
much of their own pronunciation was r-ful (Labov 2006, discussed in Gordon 2013, p. 69, from which the
following passage is drawn):
Labov recounts an especially poignant case of this phenomenon. He interviewed a middle class
mother and her daughter who offered strong opinions about many of the phonological variables
and ridiculed speakers from the subjective reaction test, including one who dropped an [r] in
one word. They insisted that their own speech was impeccably r-ful. Labov “unwisely” played
back part of their interview to demonstrate that they regularly dropped [r] too. This left them
“disheartened in a way that was painful to see” (Labov 2006, p. 314)
.
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3. There are two basic approaches to verifying descriptive statements about language:
the extensional approach, which looks at the use of expressions, and the intensional
approach, which involves eliciting the beliefs of speakers about the meaning or use
of expressions. Ordinary language philosophers “tend toward an armchair version of
the extensional approach”, ignoring the intensional approach. The two approaches
may yield conflicting results, so relying only on one method will not give a complete
picture of ordinary use.
Before diving deep into Cavell’s defense of the methods of ordinary language philos-
ophy, I want to explore an alternative response to Mates’s challenge that there are good
reasons to reject. The failure of that defense will then show what Cavell’s defense has to
avoid in order to be successful.
3 How not to defend ordinary language philosophy: conventionalism and “legiti-
mate use”
Both Searle (1969) and Vendler (1967) attempt to defend the idea of a priori knowledge
of language against a Mates-style challenge. Both attempt to address point 2 in my recon-
struction of Mates’s challenge, by giving reasons to reject skepticism about the reliability
of armchair claims about how expressions are used. Both Searle and Vendler respond to
that kind of skepticism by drawing analogies between our knowledge of how to play games
(baseball in Searle’s case and chess in Vendler’s) and our knowledge of how to use linguis-
tic expressions.
Vendler explains how certain kinds of knowledge about chess don’t involve conducting
any empirical investigations:
Suppose that while watching a game of chess I see two Pawns of the same
color standing in the same column. Then I say: “One of them must have taken
an opposing piece in a previous move”. How do I know this? Is it sufficient to
say that in all chess games we ever witnessed this correlation held? No, given
the rules of the game, the relation holds a priori; the contrary is not something
unusual or unlikely: it is inconceivable (Vendler, 1967, p. 17).
The linguist, according to Vendler, is analogous to an observer of chess who wants to de-
scribe its rules by observing what players of chess regard as admissible moves. Discovering
the existence of the rules is an empirical project, but the rules lay down necessary require-
ments on movements in the game, and given knowledge of the rules, one can derive a
priori knowledge about the possibility of particular configurations of pieces on the board.
For Vendler, speakers of a language are entitled to statements about ordinary language on
the same grounds that one who knows the rules of chess is entitled to the claim, made of
two pawns of the same color standing in the same column that “one of them must have
taken an opposing piece in a previous move”. The entitlement is not based on observa-
tion, but derives from the speaker’s knowledge of the rules of the language, which can be
combined to derive knowledge of unobvious conclusions.
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Similarly, Searle (1969) writes that his knowledge of particular facts about the language
he speaks is analogous to his knowledge that after hitting a fair ball in baseball, “the batter
runs in the direction of first base, and not in the direction, say, of third base or the left field
grand stand” (p. 14). Searle asks, “Now what sort of knowledge is this? On what is it
based? How is it possible?” He answers:
My knowledge is based on knowing how to play baseball, which is inter alia having
internalized a set of rules. I wish to suggest that my knowledge of linguistic characterizations
is of a similar kind.
If this is correct, then the answer to the philosopher’s question, “What would we say
if. . . ?” is not a prediction about future verbal behavior but a hypothetical statement of intention
within a system of rules, where mastery of the rules dictates the answer . . .
The “game-like” account of how one knows statements about one’s native language without
having to observe any linguistic behavior goes as follows:
1. A speaker of a language knows a set of rules governing the language.
2. One can derive particular pieces of a priori knowledge about the language by apply-
ing those rules.
The “game-like” explanation of a priori linguistic knowledge proposed by Searle and
Vendler is not radical; in fact it is a way of stating one of the basic commitments of stan-
dard compositional theories of semantics. Speakers of a language are able to derive the
meaning of an infinite number of novel sentences from their knowledge of a finite stock of
lexical items and rules for assembling those items into complex wholes. Such an account
is meant to explain how speakers know the meaning of sentences they have never observed
in use before; in that sense the standard semantic picture is a story about a form of a priori
linguistic knowledge.
While this “game-like” explanation of how speakers can acquire knowledge of unob-
vious linguistic facts about the language they speak without leaving their armchairs looks
promising, Jackman (2001) argues that such an account doesn’t do the work the ordinary
language philosopher needs it to do (Jackman calls this account “conventionalist”, and I
will adopt his terminology). The first prong of Jackman’s attack involves driving a wedge
between a speaker’s a priori knowledge of her own idiolect and knowledge that anyone else
speaks the same language. Jackman cites Searle saying “That my idiolect matches a given
dialect group is indeed an empirical hypothesis (for which I have a lifetime of ‘evidence’),
but the truth that in my idiolect “oculist” means eye doctor is not refuted by evidence con-
cerning the behavior of others” (Searle 1969, p. 13). The conventionalist story of how a
priori linguistic knowledge (or knowledge of the rules of a game) is possible explains only
how a speaker can have a priori knowledge of her own idiolect (or the rules of the game
that she is following), but any move beyond the individual to knowledge of linguistic facts
about a community of speakers (how “we” ordinarily use an expression) involves an “em-
pirical hypothesis”. The conventionalist therefore falls short of justifying statements of the
sort that interest the ordinary language philosopher, which concern what we mean when we
say certain things.
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The second prong of Jackman’s attack on the conventionalist account of a priori lin-
guistic knowledge targets the assumption that speakers have a priori knowledge even of
their own idiolect. Drawing on examples from Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979), Jackman
argues that “a speaker’s discriminatory capacities often underdetermine or even misiden-
tify what one is talking about” (p. 318). For example, Burge describes a situation in which
a competent speaker consistently misapplies the expression “arthritis”, which reveals the
possibility that speakers may have internalized mistaken linguistic rules. Recognizing the
possibility of linguistic ignorance of the Putnam and Burge varieties “comes with a corre-
sponding uncertainty about the mastery of one’s own language” (p. 319).
The two prongs of Jackman’s attack amount to a dilemma for someone who wants to
defend the idea that we have a priori entitlement to claims about what “we” mean:
1. If speakers have a priori knowledge of what the expressions of their language mean,
then they aren’t entitled to generalize from their own language to a public language.
2. If the language that speakers know is shared, then they cannot have a priori knowl-
edge of the meaning of expressions of the language.
The upshot of the dilemma is that there cannot be a priori knowledge that one’s language
(or the rules one is playing by) is shared—but that is just what it seems ordinary language
philosophers need in order to respond to Mates’s challenge.
Some recent defenders of the methods of ordinary language philosophy rely on ver-
sions of the conventionalist response to Mates that sidestep worries about idiolects by as-
suming that certain practitioners of ordinary language philosophy have access to “objective
facts about linguistic norms”. For example, Sandis (2010) distinguishes ordinary language
philosophy from recent experimental investigations of topics of philosophical interest by
claiming that ordinary language philosophy makes observations about “proper linguistic
usage” and “legitimate use”:
OLP [ordinary language philosophy], by contrast [with experimental philoso-
phy of language], is not interested in what the majority of people happen to
think at any given time and place but, rather, in objective facts about linguistic
norms (p. 185).
When OLP talks of what we would say, it refers not to the latest up-to-the-
minute statistics about what happens to be the case but to well-established,
legitimate use, distinguishing further between paradigm and peripheral cases
(p. 186).
The invocation of “correct” or “legitimate” use (or simply “the use”—see Hanfling
(2000)) recalls Ryle’s distinction between use and usage, where use is explicitly normative,
while usage is not. When he considers this aspect of Ryle’s view, Mates dismisses it, and
says, “What authority deems it wrong to use the word ‘voluntary’ as the philosopher does
[as opposed to the ordinary speaker]?” (Mates, 1958, p. 164) That is a centrally important
9
question for the defender of ordinary language philosophy who invokes “correct” or “le-
gitimate” use. It is a question that Cavell attempts to answer, and his answer is strikingly
different than the conventionalist response to Mates’s challenge. I think V.C. Chappell
(1964) is still correct (more than 50 years later) in his assessment that Cavell gives “the
most detailed explanation and defense of the procedures of ordinary language philosophers
that has yet appeared”. In the remainder of this paper, I will describe Cavell’s response
to Mates’s attack and show how it avoids the problems that arise for the conventionalist
defense of ordinary language philosophy.
4 Cavell’s defense of the methods of ordinary language philosophy in “Must We
Mean What We Say?”
As Bates and Cohen (1972) observe, explicating Cavell “is no picnic”, but the basic outlines
of what Cavell argues in his (1958) defense of ordinary language philosophy are clear:
He denies point 1 in Mates’s challenge, by arguing that there is a normative element to
statements about ordinary use, he disputes point 2 by arguing that native speakers of a
language are authoritative regarding ordinary uses of expressions in that language, and he
claims that Mates’s discussion of intensional and extensional methods are “irrelevant” to
the concerns of ordinary language philosophy as he defends it (Cavell, 1958, p. 131).
4.1 On the reliability of judgments about ordinary language
Cavell distinguishes two types of statements about ordinary language:
Type 1: “Statements which produce instances of what is said in a language (‘We do
say . . . but we don’t say —’)”
Type 2: Instances of what is said in a language “accompanied by explications—
statements which make explicit what is implied when we say what statements of the
first type instance us as saying (‘When we say . . . we imply (suggest, say) —’)”.
The clash between Austin and Ryle involves statements of different types: Cavell says
Austin produces a statement of type 1 (“we may make a gift voluntarily”) while Ryle makes
a claim of type 2, about what “voluntary” and “involuntary” mean—that when we describe
an action as voluntary or involuntary, we imply that the action ought not to be done.9 Cavell
allows that Ryle’s type 2 statement is wrong, but he rejects Mates’s charge that Ryle lacks
good evidence for making such a statement (whether or not it is correct). Ryle has good
evidence for his claim simply in virtue of being a native speaker of English:
Such speakers do not, in general, need evidence for what is said in the
language; they are the source of such evidence. . .
9Cavell misdescribes Austin’s remark, which is not metalinguistic—it doesn’t mention “what we say”, it
simply produces an example of something that does make sense. The fact that it makes sense is evidence
against Ryle’s Type-2 statement, however, in the way Cavell describes.
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[F]or a native speaker to say what, in ordinary circumstances, is said when,
no such special information is needed or claimed. All that is needed is the
truth of the proposition that a natural language is what native speakers of that
language speak (pp. 174–176).
Cavell is right that it would be absurd to think that native speakers of a language need
“special information” or have to “count noses” before they know how to use some expres-
sion in the language they speak. There have to be native speakers saying things for any data
about ordinary use to exist. But it’s a different question when speakers go beyond speaking
their language to make meta-linguistic claims about how expressions are ordinarily used.
Fodor and Katz (1963, p. 60) criticize Cavell for missing the distinction between using an
expression and making statements about how that expression is used:
What Cavell misses is the distinction between what a native speaker says (the
utterances he produces in the course of speaking) and what he says about
what he and other native speakers say (the metalinguistic comments he makes
when the reflective mood is upon him). There can be no doubt but that most
(though definitely not all) of the utterances of a native speaker are utterances
of the speaker’s language. This truth is guaranteed by the truism that a natu-
ral language is what a native speaker of that language speaks. However, the
statements that a native speaker makes about his language, his metalinguistic
claims, need not be true in order for the linguist to have noses to count.
Fodor and Katz overextend their criticism of Cavell here—though a restricted version
of their objection is important. It is standard practice in linguistics and philosophy of lan-
guage to make use of meta-linguistic judgments of speakers as evidence for and against
theoretical hypotheses.10 In syntax, theorists make use of speakers’ meta-linguistic judg-
ments about the acceptability of various constructions, like the following:11
Please indicate which of the following two sentences sounds more acceptable:
(1) Ginny remembered to have brought the beer.
(2) Ginny remembered to bring the beer. (Sprouse et al., 2013, p. 237)
And in semantics and pragmatics, speakers are often asked to make truth value judg-
ments about claims made in various contexts, or judgments about entailment relations. For
example, as part of the evaluation of the semantics of “donkey sentences”, Geurts (2002
p. 135–136) asked participants to judge whether the statement “Every boy that stands next
to a girl holds her hand” is a true description of the situation depicted in Figure 1.
10This is pointed out, in response to Fodor and Katz, by Bates and Cohen (1972).
11“The data syntacticians predominately appeal to are speaker/hearers’ intuitive judgements of acceptabil-
ity and interpretability (suffice it to say, any relevant data are admissible; intuitions are simply readily avail-
able, not obviously misleading, and have no serious competitor as a data source)” (Collins, 2007, p. 887). For
a summary of discussions of the role of meta-linguistic intuitions in syntax, see Sprouse (2013).
11
Figure 1: Every boy that stands next to a girl holds her hand.
The use of speakers’ meta-linguistic judgments about truth and acceptability reflects a
central assumption of contemporary research in the language sciences, namely, that such
judgments are products of speakers’ underlying (tacit) linguistic knowledge. While speak-
ers’ meta-linguistic judgments about acceptability and truth are widely regarded as useful
tools in the investigation of syntax, meaning, and use, it is a further, much more contentious
question whether individual speakers’ judgments about how a group of speakers would use
a particular expression are reliable.
Mates is skeptical that ordinary speakers are reliable when asked to make these kinds
of judgments. Only recently have there been any systematic examinations that bear on
whether ordinary speakers are reliable judges about other speakers’ linguistic behavior.
The studies that have been conducted have yielded results that, while they do not support
general skepticism about the reliability of group-directed meta-linguistic judgments, also
do not support Cavell’s claim that the ordinary language philosopher has “good evidence”
for statements of type 1 or type 2 simply in virtue of being a native speaker of English.
Experimental investigations in both linguistics and philosophy have indicated that meta-
linguistic judgments about acceptability made by ordinary speakers and those made by
experts are highly correlated with one another, which is evidence that generalizations from
one’s own judgment to judgments of the group are reliable (Culbertson and Gross, 2009;
Myers, 2009; Sprouse et al., 2013). These findings might be taken to support the ordinary
language philosophers’ method of relying on armchair meta-linguistic judgments, since (in
the acceptability judgment tasks that have been experimentally examined) those armchair
judgments correlate with ordinary speakers’ judgments in experimental conditions. But it
is a further question whether ordinary and expert meta-linguistic judgments about semantic
and pragmatic facts, like what particular names or natural kind terms refer to, correlate in
the same way. And there is evidence from experimental investigations that, in certain cases,
there is substantial interpersonal variation in meta-linguistic judgments.12
12For evidence concerning proper names, see the debate surrounding Machery et al. (2004). Genone
(2012) and Hansen (2015) provide summaries of that debate. For evidence concerning natural kind terms,
see Braisby et al. (1996), Jylkka¨ et al. (2009) Genone and Lombrozo (2012), and Nichols et al. (2016).
Hansen (2015) provides a summary of the experimental evidence for natural kind terms. For related evidence
12
In summary, given the existing experimental evidence, there is reason to think that arm-
chair meta-linguistic judgments about certain linguistic properties (acceptability) reliably
generalize, while armchair meta-linguistic judgments about other properties (reference, sat-
isfaction conditions for adjectives) may not. Overall, that is bad news for both general
skepticism about the reliability of armchair metalinguistic judgments and for Cavell’s op-
timism about the reliability of such judgments. It will take much more experimental work
to determine the exact contours of ordinary speakers’ ability to make reliable judgments
about the linguistic behavior of groups they belong to.
4.2 Categorial declaratives
Cavell’s response to Mates’s challenge that invokes the fact that native speakers of a lan-
guage are reliable judges of how words are ordinarily used does not stand up to scrutiny.
But there is a different line of response suggested by Cavell that isn’t subject to the same
worries. I will develop that response in the remainder of this paper.
Cavell (1958) is centrally concerned with the relation between what someone says and
what she means by what she says. The significance of the question in the title of the essay,
“Must We Mean What We Say?”, is whether there is any logical (or otherwise necessary)
connection between “what you (explicitly) say and what saying it implies or suggests”
(p. 196). Cavell revises Ryle’s type 2 statement about “voluntary” to accommodate Austin’s
observations, and produces the following statement, which he refers to as “S”:
S “When we ask whether an action is voluntary we imply that the action is fishy”
Cavell says that “Something important will be learned if we realize that we do not
know what kind of assertion S is” (p. 181). S is “obviously” not analytic, Cavell says,
because “it is perfectly true that ‘voluntary’ does not mean (you will not find set beside it
in a dictionary) ‘fishy’)” (p. 181). And yet Cavell expresses the feeling that S expresses a
necessary truth, and he assumes that if a statement expresses a necessary truth then it has
to be known a priori. That combination of necessity and a prioricity with non-analyticity
is what poses the problem Cavell tries to solve:
When (if) you feel that S is necessarily true, that it is a priori, you will have
to explain how a statement which is obviously not analytic can be true a priori
(p. 181).13
It is important to note that Cavell is writing at a time before widespread acknowledge-
ment of two conceptual distinctions that became very important to analytic philosophy in
the latter half of the 20th century:
• Necessary truths can be known a posteriori.
concerning adjectives, see Hansen and Chemla (2016).
13Cavell was teaching the Critique of Pure Reason at Berkeley around the time that he was writing “Must
We Mean What We Say?” (Cavell, 2010, p. 277).
13
• There is a distinction between what a statement necessarily implies in virtue of its
(context-invariant) meaning and what making a statement implicates, which is con-
text dependent.
Acknowledging either distinction would help explain what kind of assertion S is. First, sup-
posing that S does express a necessary truth, it need not be knowable a priori. Informative
identity statements, like “Hesperus is Phosphorus” are necessarily true, but can be a pos-
teriori discoveries (Kripke, 1980, Lecture II). Even if Cavell were right that S expresses a
necessary truth, it could be discovered via an empirical scientific investigation of language.
Second, Cavell is interested in the regularities that exist between what is explicitly said
and what is suggested or conveyed by what is said. It is these regularities that are of central
importance to the ordinary language philosophers who want to argue that philosophers are
“stretching” or distorting the ordinary meaning of expressions by ignoring the connections
between what is explicitly said and what is conveyed by what is said. Ryle’s discussion of
the way philosophers distort the meaning of “voluntary” and “involuntary”, for example,
relies on the idea that there is some regular connection between those expressions and
the actions they describe being something that someone ought not to do. That is, Ryle
thinks that saying that some action is voluntary will convey that the action ought not to be
done. When philosophers wonder whether actions of a certain type are voluntary or not
when there is no question of whether or not the action ought not to be done, then they are
distorting the ordinary meaning of “voluntary”.
Cavell calls the connection between what is explicitly said and what is suggested or
conveyed by what is said a “necessary” connection.14 But that is to overstate the kind of
regularity that exists between what is explicitly said and what is conveyed or suggested by
what is explicitly said. Consider Cavell’s own example of a “necessary” truth, namely S.
It is doubtful that S expresses a necessary truth, because there are contexts in which one
can ask whether an action is “voluntary” without suggesting that there is anything fishy
about the action (bracketing the fact that it’s not really clear what a “fishy” action would
be). Consider the following questions, which are based on naturally occurring sentences
obtained through the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA):
(3) Was the contraception proposed by the Gates Foundation as part of the Family
Planning 2020 initiative going to be voluntary? (http://goo.gl/gkzpHH)
(4) Was the administrative fee taken out during the first three years of employment
voluntary? (http://goo.gl/axQqCp)
It is unclear what the “fishy” suggestion either of these questions would be. The first
question concerns whether the contraception is voluntary, as opposed to mandatory, and the
second question concerns whether the administrative fee can be waived by the employee or
not.
A better way of capturing the relation between what is said and what is conveyed by
what is said is introduced by Grice’s (1975) “logic of conversation”, which wouldn’t have
14See Mulhall (1999, pp. 13–14) for further discussion.
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been available to Cavell at the time of writing “Must We Mean What We Say?”.15 Con-
versational implicatures arise out of a combination of the content of what is explicitly said
and the “cooperative principle”—a governing principle of conversation. For example, if
I ask whether some action is voluntary, I implicate (though I do not explicitly say) that
I don’t know whether the action is voluntary. Assuming that I am making a cooperative
contribution to the conversation, my audience can (with reason) infer that I don’t know
whether the action was voluntary or not. That they draw that inference is something that
I can expect if I understand the norms of conversation. I can exploit this expectation by
asking whether some action was voluntary when I know that it was voluntary; that will
generate the false suggestion that I don’t know whether the action was voluntary. It is
the norms governing cooperative conversations, rather than anything about the meaning of
“voluntary”, that generate expectations regarding the question. Expectations about what I
have implicated are not completely under the speaker’s control, but they also do not reflect
necessary connections between what is explicitly said and what is conveyed or suggested.
To the contrary: implicatures differ from the context-invariant implications associated with
what is explicitly said in that they are context-dependent.
The unavailability of those two conceptual distinctions constrains the range of options
open to Cavell in his discussion of statements about ordinary language, and he recognizes
that the conceptual tools available to him are inadequate to his task:
At this point the argument has become aporetic. ‘Statements about ordinary
language’. . . are not analytic, and they are not (it would be misleading to call
them) synthetic (just like that). Nor do we know whether to say they are a
priori, or whether to account for their air of necessity as a dialectical illusion,
due more to the motion of our argument than to their own nature. Given our
current alternatives, there is no way to classify such statements; we do not yet
know what they are (p. 184).
Even given these limitations, part of Cavell’s proposal for understanding “statements about
ordinary language” is worth salvaging. In the remaining part of this section I will spell out
what I think that part is.
Cavell begins his discussion of how it is possible to be entitled to make S-type state-
ments without conducting empirical observations by distinguishing S from a similar-sounding
statement T, which he says “does seem obviously synthetic”:
T “Is X voluntary?” implies X is fishy.
He says:
But S and T, though they are true together and false together, are not every-
where interchangeable; the identical state of affairs is described by both, but a
15The lectures that were the basis of Grice (1975), “Logic and Conversation”, were delivered in 1967. See
Grice (1975, p. 41). It is very doubtful that Cavell himself would endorse this way of characterizing the
relation.
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person who may be entitled to say T, may not be entitled to say S. Only a native
speaker of English is entitled to the statement S, where as a linguist describing
English may, though he is not a native speaker of English, be entitled to T.
What entitles him to T is his having gathered a certain amount and kind of ev-
idence in its favor. But the person entitled to S is not entitled to that statement
for the same reason. He needs no evidence for it. . . The question of evidence is
irrelevant (p. 182).
The interesting suggestion in this passage is that one can be entitled to make a statement in
virtue of having the right kind of status as a member of a certain group—in this case, the
group of native speakers of English. S, unlike T, uses the first person plural “we”, which
presupposes that the speaker is included in the group (or “plural individual”) denoted by
“we” (Schlenker, 2003, p. 5). If the presupposition is satisfied, it can be the case that the
speaker is entitled to “speak for the group”, and introduce, or reinforce, a rule.
Cavell observes that statements that share the same surface form as type-T (or type-S)
statements can be used to perform a different kind of speech act16—instead of purporting
to state a fact, they can be used to introduce a rule, “a way of doing or saying something
which is to be followed”:
Whether remarks. . . ‘about’ ordinary language, and equally about ordinary actions—
are statements or rules depends on how they are taken: if they are taken to state
facts and are supposed to be believed, they are statements; if they are taken as
guides and supposed to be followed, they are rules (p. 184).
Statements about what “we” do can play this role: “[I]f someone is tempted not to fulfill
a promise, you may say, ‘Promises are kept’, or ‘We keep our promises (that is the sort
of thing a promise is)’, thus employing a rule-description—what I have called a categorial
declarative” (p. 195). A categorial declarative would not be challenged by citing evidence
that the group referred to by “we” does not always conform to the proposed rule. Consider
the following sentence:
(5) We send thank-you cards in this family.
The utterer of (5), understood as a categorial declarative, is not entitled to it on the grounds
of observing the past behavior of her family. It may even turn out that members of the
family have not usually sent thank-you cards. But that fact does not mean that the speaker
is not entitled to utter (5), and pointing it out would not constitute a refutation of (5).
Understood as a categorial declarative, (5) could be challenged in the following way:
(6) That’s not for you to say.
The entitlement to the utterance (5) in the situation described does not stem from ob-
servation, but from occupying a certain position of authority in the group spoken for. As
16Bates and Cohen (1972, p. 11) observe that “Cavell is concerned with something like speech acts [in his
discussion of categorial declaratives]”.
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Cavell says about statements of type S, understood as categorial declaratives, the question
of evidence is irrelevant for one’s entitlement to assert (5).
The parallel between (5) and the case of claims about what “we” say is that speakers
can occupy an analogous position of authority among fellow speakers of a language. State-
ments like S can be used to perform two different kinds of speech act. Critics of ordinary
language philosophy (Mates and Fodor and Katz, for example) have focused exclusively
on the act of describing, and wonder where the entitlement for such a claim comes from
if not from observation of actual linguistic behavior. But Cavell’s central claim in “Must
We Mean What We Say?”, as I understand it, is that the rule-giving aspect of statements
like S has been overlooked. Entitlement to the rule-giving kind of speech act is derived
from occupying a position of suitable authority with respect to those included in the group
referred to with “we”, and challenging that kind of speech act requires a different kind of
challenge than presenting evidence that “we” do not in fact act as the speaker seems to be
saying that we do. Challenging the speaker’s entitlement to the rule-giving aspect of the
categorial declarative involves contesting the speaker’s entitlement to speak on behalf of
the relevant group (as in (6)).
If this way of understanding Cavell’s proposal is correct, it would provide a way of
responding to Mates’s challenge that doesn’t run into objections from the spotty reliability
of armchair meta-linguistic judgments about how we speak. Recall that Mates rejects the
idea that the statements of ordinary language philosophers about language are “normative”,
even though Ryle distinguishes what he calls “use” and “misuse” from the descriptive pat-
terns of “usage”. Mates’s criticisms are directed at the statements of ordinary language
philosophers on the assumption that they are (non-normative) descriptions. But if my in-
terpretation of Cavell is correct, then Cavell should be seen as rejecting Mates’s starting
assumption and insisting that there is a central normative component to the statements of
the ordinary language philosophers—statements about what we say are not just descrip-
tions, they are proposals as to how words should be used.17
4.3 Aesthetic judgments and claims about ordinary language
In ‘Must We Mean What We Say?’, Cavell does not discuss in detail what would entitle
someone to make S-type statements about ordinary language. He says “An examination
of what does entitle a person to the statement S would be required in any full account of
such statements. Such an examination is out of the question here” (Cavell 1958, p. 182).
But he returns to the topic and enriches his discussion with a new metaphor in ‘Aesthetic
Problems of Modern Philosophy’ (Cavell 1976a, originally published in 1965). His new
17Some early commentators on ordinary language philosophy detected the normative component in state-
ments about ordinary language, but without developing the idea in any detail: “We strongly suspect that
cases of putative ordinary language analysis are, in fact, disguised reformations” (Maxwell and Feigl, 1961,
p. 489); “There are innumerable cases in the philosophy of language where we realize that what we off hand
may have interpreted to be a language hypothesis is. . . more readily understood as a verbal recommendation,
as a convention, or as any other type of normative statement, say a proposal for how to use a given linguistic
expression. . . ” (Tennessen, 1962, p. 507).
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way of thinking about ‘the characteristic claim. . . of ordinary language philosophers’ is to
compare them with aesthetic judgments:
I will suggest that the aesthetic judgment models the sort of claim entered by
these philosophers, and that the familiar lack of conclusiveness in aesthetic
argument, rather than showing up an irrationality, shows the kind of rationality
it has, and needs (Cavell, 1976a, p. 86).
Cavell uses different patterns of disagreement and reason-giving to illustrate the dif-
ference between two types of aesthetic judgment—a mere judgment of “sense” versus a
judgment of “reflection”—and a non-aesthetic judgment (whether there is a goldfinch in
the garden). The patterns of disagreement that distinguish the two types of aesthetic judg-
ment go as follows:
1. A: Canary wine is pleasant.
B: How can you say that? It tastes like canary droppings.
A: Well, I like it.
2. A: He plays beautifully, doesn’t he?
B: Yes, too beautifully. Beethoven is not Chopin.
Or he [B] may answer:
B: How can you say that? There was no line, no structure, no idea what the
music was about. He’s simply an impressive colorist (p. 91).
Whereas it is unremarkable to defend a mere judgment of sense by responding to a
challenge with “Well, I like it” (as in dialogue 1), it would be “feeble” to respond to the
challenge in dialogue 2 by saying “Well, I liked it”. Moreover, while A doesn’t have to
engage with B by giving some reasons to defend the assessment of the beautiful playing, if
he doesn’t, Cavell says “there is a price he will have to pay in our estimate of him” (p. 92).
That is a difference in the obligations that one undertakes when making a judgment of
reflection rather than a mere judgment of sense. Cavell then uses the same strategy to dis-
tinguish both types of aesthetic judgment from a judgment about a (more) straightforward
matter of fact—whether there is a goldfinch in the garden:
A: There is a goldfinch in the garden.
B: How do you know?
A: From the color of its head.
B: But goldcrests also have heads that color.
A: Well, I think it’s a goldfinch (it’s a goldfinch to me).
In the goldfinch discussion, it’s not open to A to retreat to a personal judgment without
giving up his claim to be a “competent interlocutor in matters of knowledge (about birds?)”
(p. 92).
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In addition to the different patterns of challenge and retraction that characterize judg-
ments of reflection, Cavell ties the success of such judgments not to their accuracy in stating
the facts, but to their ability to convince the audience to see and acknowledge the relevant
fact. The story of Sancho Panza’s relatives Hume relates in “Of the Standard of Taste” is
used to illustrate this criterion of success: they are ridiculed for their evaluation of the qual-
ity of a hogshead of wine on the grounds that they say it tastes of iron and leather.18 But
when the barrel is empty, a rusty iron key on a leather thong is found at the bottom. Cavell’s
reading of this episode is that it is an example of the wrong model of understanding how
aesthetic judgments are vindicated:
It dissociates the exercise of taste from the discipline of accounting for it: but
all that makes the critic’s expression of taste worth more than another man’s
is his ability to produce for himself the thong and key of his response; and his
vindication comes not from his pointing out that it is, or was, in the barrel, but
in getting us to taste it there (p. 87).
How should this model be applied to S-type statements about ordinary language? It
gives a fuller picture of the thin nature of authority that is required for someone to be enti-
tled to S-type statements about ordinary language that remains underdescribed in “Must We
Mean What We Say?” While the authority that is required to make such statements consists
in merely being a speaker of the relevant language, the success conditions of such state-
ments involve a very demanding, and fickle, component: successful categorial declaratives
require getting one’s audience to acknowledge their correctness by adopting the proposed
rule of use. Those elements clearly distinguish categorial declaratives from statements
about ordinary use made by linguists: entitlement to such statements does require possess-
ing evidence of how people do in fact use language, and the success of such statements
does not require the audience to embrace any rule of use.
4.4 Austin at criticism
For Cavell, Austin represents the “purest version of ‘ordinary language philosophy’” (Cavell,
1976b, p. 98), and he compares Austin’s practice of drawing fine distinctions and making
illuminating comparisons to the methods of an art critic:
The positive purpose in Austin’s distinctions resembles the art critic’s purpose
in comparing and distinguishing works of art, namely, that in this crosslight
the capacities and salience of an individual object are brought to attention and
focus (Cavell, 1976b, p. 103).
Examining how Austin distinguishes and compares the meaning of expressions will make
Cavell’s comparison of Austin to an art critic—and more generally, his comparison of
statements about ordinary language to aesthetic judgments—more concrete.
18Presumably those were not accepted terms for describing the taste of wine in 17th century Spain; maybe
a more contemporary equivalent would be saying that a wine tastes of “too many tramlines”. See the “Wines-
manship” section of Potter (2005) for discussion.
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Austin’s most famous lexical distinction concerns the expressions “mistake” and “ac-
cident”. He says that the choice to apply one or the other of these expressions to describe
a situation can “appear indifferent. . . Yet a story or two, and everybody will not merely
agree that they are completely different, but even discover for himself what the difference
is and what each means” (Austin, 1957, pp. 10–11). To distinguish the meaning of these
expressions, Austin tells two contrasting “donkey stories”, which make it seem clear that
“by mistake” better describes the action in one situation, and “by accident” better describes
the action in the other, thereby providing evidence that the meanings of the two expressions
are indeed distinct:
You have a donkey, so have I, and they graze in the same field. The day comes
when I conceive a dislike for mine. I go to shoot it, draw a bead on it, fire:
the brute falls in its tracks. I inspect the victim, and find to my horror that it is
your donkey. I appear on your doorstep with the remains and say—what? ‘I
say, old sport, I’m awfully sorry, &c., I’ve shot your donkey by accident?’ Or
‘by mistake’? Then again, I go to shoot my donkey as before, draw a bead on
it, fire—but as I do so, the beasts move, and to my horror yours falls. Again
the scene on the doorstep—what do I say? ‘By mistake’? Or ‘by accident’?
(Austin 1957, p. 11 n. 4)
Those who read Austin’s donkey stories tend to reach the same conclusion about which
term to apply in which situation: “by mistake” better suits the first story, and “by accident”
the second.19 Backed by the donkey stories, we can issue two S-type statements that have
achieved the kind of vindication, in their acknowledgement by those who read Austin’s
donkey stories, that Cavell says is an aim of aesthetic judgments:
(7) In the first story, we say you shot your neighbor’s donkey by mistake.
(8) In the second story, we say you shot your neighbor’s donkey by accident.
A comparison with a less successful application of Austin’s method shows, by way of
contrast, how clearly the donkey stories compel us to acknowledge a difference in meaning
between doing something “by mistake” and “by accident”. The gocart story from (Austin,
1966) is intended to distinguish the meaning of “intentionally” and “deliberately”:
I am summoned to quell a riot in India. Speed is imperative. My mind runs on
the action to be taken five miles down the road at he Residency. As I set off
down the drive, my cookboy’s child’s new gocart, the apple of her eye, is right
across the road. I realize I could stop, get out, and move it, but to hell with
that: I must push on. It’s too bad, that’s all: I drive right over it and am on my
way. In this case, a snap decision is taken on what is essentially an incidental
matter. I did drive over the gocart deliberately, but not intentionally—nor, of
course, unintentionally either. It was never part of my intention to drive over
the gocart. At no time did I intend to drive over it. It was incidental to anything
19See, for example, Gustafsson (2005, p. 368), and Hanfling (2000, p. 64).
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I intended to do, which was simply to get to the scene of the riot in order to
quell it. However “odd” it may sound, I feel little doubt that we should say
here that we did run over the gocart deliberately and that we should not care to
say we ran over it intentionally. We never intended to run over it (p. 432).
One crucial difference between this story and the donkey stories is that Austin provides
a “gloss” on how to describe the action of driving over the gocart: he says that it was done
deliberately, but not intentionally, because “we never intended to run over it”. Prompted by
the feeling that this story didn’t compel agreement to the same degree as the donkey stories,
and the fact that it has been argued that doing something intentionally does not require
intending to do it (see Harman 1976), Hansen and Chemla (2015) constructed a formal
experiment in which the gocart story was presented to experimental participants in three
conditions: (i) with Austin’s original gloss, (ii) with a reversed gloss that made the case that
the gocart was driven over intentionally, but not deliberately, and (iii) with no gloss either
way. In Hansen and Chemla’s experiment, it was easy to reverse participants’ judgments
about the gocart story by reversing the glosses, and in the “no-gloss” condition, where
participants were asked to say whether “deliberately” or “intentionally” better described
the action of driving over the gocart, no preference was observed either way. (Fig. 1,
Hansen and Chemla 2015). The experiment lends support to the thought that the story
itself (without a gloss) is insufficient to generate agreement with Austin’s judgement that
we should say that we ran over the gocart deliberately, but not intentionally.
If the criteria of success for an S-type statement of “what we say” were the same as
those for an observation made by an empirically-informed linguist, then Austin’s remarks
regarding how we use “deliberately” and “intentionally” would simply be incorrect. The
gocart experiment in Hansen and Chemla (2015) did not find any evidence that English
speakers have a preference regarding whether “deliberately” and “intentionally” better de-
scribes the action of running over the gocart. But if we follow Cavell in his analogy between
S-type statements and aesthetic judgments, Austin’s gloss is not a detachable component of
the case for why we (should) describe the story in the way Austin suggests. In his reading
of the gocart story, Austin makes the case that we should describe the action of running
over the gocart as done deliberately, but not intentionally, because we did not intend to
run it over. As mentioned above, whether that connection exists has been contested. But
the important point for assessing Austin’s methodology is that in his account of what “we
should say” or “should not care to say” about the case, he is proposing that “deliberately” is
a better term to use in describing the action than “intentionally”—whether or not speakers
would prefer to use one term or the other before adopting his proposal.
4.5 Categorial declaratives and meta-linguistic negotiation
Cavell’s analogy between categorial declaratives (S-type statements) and aesthetic judg-
ments has provided a sketch of what is required for one to be entitled to make such state-
ments (merely being a speaker of the language) and what is required for such statements
to be successful (audience endorsement of the proposed use). Our understanding of how
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categorial declaratives operate can be enriched by considering recent discussions in philos-
ophy of language of how what look like straightforward statements of fact can be playing
a normative, metalinguistic role (Sundell, 2010; Plunkett and Sundell, 2013, 2014).
Barker (2002, pp. 1–2) describes a “metalinguistic use” of “tall”:
Normally, (9) will be used in order to add to the common ground new in-
formation concerning Feynman’s height:
(9) Feynman is tall.
But (9) has another mode of use. Imagine that we are at a party. Perhaps
Feynman stands before us a short distance away, drinking punch and thinking
about dancing; in any case, the exact degree to which Feynman is tall is com-
mon knowledge. You ask me what counts as tall in my country. “Well,” I say,
“around here,. . . ” and I continue by uttering (9).
Barker (p. 2) characterizes what is communicated by an utterance of (1) in the situation he
describes as follows: “My purpose in uttering (9) under such circumstances would be noth-
ing more than to communicate something about how to use a certain word appropriately—it
would be a metalinguistic use”.
Plunkett and Sundell enrich Barker’s picture of metalinguistic use by adding the pos-
sibility that metalinguistic uses of expressions can debate not only how expressions are
used, but how those expressions should be used (Plunkett and Sundell, 2013, p. 3). They
illustrate this possibility with metalinguistic disputes over the use of evaluative expressions
like “spicy”, where it isn’t the case that there is some antecedently settled local standard
for what makes something count as spicy. Spiciness is up for grabs in such a situation, and
the appropriate use of “spicy” has to be “negotiated” by the participants in the conversation
(p. 15). A pair of statements like (10) and (11) can function as moves in a metalinguistic
negotiation about the appropriate use of the adjective “spicy”:
(10) That chili is spicy!
(11) No, it’s not spicy at all. (Plunkett and Sundell, 2013, p. 15)
Adopting Plunkett and Sundell’s terminology, let a “metalinguistic proposal” be an
individual move in a metalinguistic negotiation: it is a proposal for how an expression
should be used.
A metalinguistic proposal, like a categorial declarative, has a descriptive form and a
normative conversational role. Cavell’s central examples of categorial declaratives involve
statements about what saying something conveys or implicates, and what is implicated by
what is said should be a good candidate for metalinguistic negotiation, since they aren’t ex-
plicitly encoded in what is said and Grice observes that what is implicated is indeterminate
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(Grice, 1975, p. 58).20 There should therefore be room to negotiate what is conveyed or
implicated by an utterance.
Consider again Cavell’s example of a categorial declarative, S:
S “When we ask whether an action is voluntary, we imply that the action is fishy”
How can a speaker be entitled to say S without “counting noses”? Once S is understood
as a metalinguistic proposal for how “voluntary” should be used (as implicating that the
action it describes is somehow “fishy”), and not a description of the antecedently settled use
of “voluntary”, then the entitlement to S will come from the speaker’s status as a speaker
of the language. But the success of such a proposal will depend on the speaker’s ability to
get her audience to accept her proposal, as Cavell discusses in his invocation of the parallel
between statements about ordinary use and aesthetic judgments.
Using the notion of a metalinguistic proposal, it is also possible to illuminate what
Austin is doing when he draws fine-grained differences in meaning between expressions
like “intentionally” and “deliberately”. As discussed above, Hansen and Chemla (2015)
found no evidence that ordinary speakers draw a clear distinction between the meaning of
doing something “intentionally” and doing it “deliberately”. But Austin wants to distin-
guish the meaning of those two expressions, and he argues that in his gocart story, it is
better to say that the protagonist runs over the gocart deliberately, but not intentionally, be-
cause the protagonist didn’t intend to run over the gocart. Austin, in discussing his method
for distinguishing the meaning of “intentionally” and “deliberately” says:
We must. . . imagine some cases (imagine them carefully and in detail and com-
prehensively) and try to reach agreement upon what we should in fact say con-
cerning them. (Austin, 1966, p. 429)
Austin’s methods for reaching agreement include “glossing” those cases—making meta-
linguistic proposals for how the relevant expressions should be used.
5 Must we measure what we mean?
Cavell argues that speakers of a language can be entitled to claims about how “we” use
expressions, without having to “count noses”. Mates (1958), Fodor and Katz (1963), and
Jackman (2001) have criticized various attempts to explain the source of that entitlement. I
have argued that an essential component of defending Cavell’s proposal requires emphasiz-
ing the normative nature of “categorial declaratives”. More specifically, I have suggested
that categorial declaratives should be understood as proposals for how expressions should
be used, or for what we should understand to be implicated by a statement. One can be
entitled to such claims in virtue of being a speaker of the relevant language without having
20Grice’s claim about the indeterminacy of implicatures was brought to my attention by Gray (2016).
Plunkett and Sundell (2013, p. 3) say that disputes over how words should be used could arise when we
are ‘resolving ambiguity, prescisifying a vague term, setting a contextual parameter, or in any other way
determining how some antecedently indeterminate matter of meaning should be settled’.
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to conduct empirical observations of how ordinary people do in fact speak. But Cavell’s
proposal for how to understand the success conditions of such claims is both demanding
and fragile—it is analogous to the conditions of a successful aesthetic judgment, which,
according to Cavell, depends on the audience having the appropriate kind of reaction (anal-
ogous to getting the audience to taste the leather and iron in the wine in the story about
Sancho Panza’s relatives). That condition on the success of a categorial declarative is hard
to satisfy—Cavell’s own attempt to tie uses of “voluntary” to fishiness is not convincing,
for example, for the reasons discussed in §4.2.
So the answer to the question must we measure what we mean?—when that is taken
as a question about the need to survey how speakers of the language actually speak when
making claims about what we mean by the use of an expression—is no, but it is extremely
difficult to make a compelling proposal about the meaning of an expression that ignores
evidence about how the expression is in fact used. Citing experimental (or corpus-based)
evidence of a distinction in use can be an effective way of convincing an audience that a
particular difference in meaning exists, and can play a powerful rhetorical role in produc-
ing the acknowledgement necessary for a successful categorial declarative. Ryle referred
to this as the feeling of being “strengthened, when told that big battalions are on [your]
side” (Ryle, 1953, p. 177). Even though Cavell is right that it is possible to be entitled to
make claims about how “we” use certain expressions without engaging in experimental or
corpus-based investigations of how words are used, contemporary practitioners of ordinary
language philosophy should not ignore the power of the big battalions.
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